Report from the Commission on competition policy 2016. SWD (2017) 175 final, 31 May 2017 by unknown
 EN    EN 
 
 
 
EUROPEAN 
COMMISSION  
Brussels, 31.5.2017  
COM(2017) 285 final 
  
REPORT FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, THE 
COUNCIL, THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COMMITTEE AND THE 
COMMITTEE OF THE REGIONS 
Report on Competition Policy 2016 
{SWD(2017) 175 final}  
 2 
 
REPORT FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, THE 
COUNCIL, THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COMMITTEE AND THE 
COMMITTEE OF THE REGIONS 
Report on Competition Policy 2016 
1. Introduction 
Competition policy is based on legal and economic principles, and it is often associated with 
those two very important aspects. But this is just a part of what competition policy is about: 
competition policy has a direct impact on people's lives, and one of its key features is 
promoting open markets so that everyone – businesses and citizens – can get a fair share of 
the benefits of growth.  
In his 2016 State of the Union speech, the President of the European Commission Jean-
Claude Juncker recalled that "(a) fair playing field also means that in Europe, consumers are 
protected against cartels and abuses by powerful companies. (…) The Commission watches 
over this fairness. This is the social side of competition law. And this is what Europe stands 
for"
1
. Competition enforcement sends the message that everyone, however rich or powerful, 
has to play by the rules. 
Competition policy cannot shape a fairer economy on its own, but it can make an important 
difference: enforcing competition law ensures that there is a voice for the consumers. 
Competition policy contributes towards a society that gives people choice, stimulates 
innovation, prevents abuses by dominant players, and drives companies to make the most of 
scarce resources thus contributing to addressing global challenges like climate change.  
In addition, all decisions taken by Europe’s competition enforcers – the Commission and 
national competition authorities – affirm that the EU is a community based on the rule of law. 
They also demonstrate to civil society that the system can work for the common good and 
deliver concrete benefits to citizens. 
Commission's competition policy actions in 2016 focused on a wide range of policy areas, 
helping make markets work more fairly for everyone. At the same time, competition policy 
continued supporting the Commission's efforts to deliver on key political priorities, in 
particular a connected Digital Single Market, a deeper and fairer internal market, and an 
integrated and climate-friendly Energy Union.  
The globalised economy also requires a global competition culture. This is why the 
Commission is strongly engaging with other EU institutions, international organisations and 
competition enforcers all over the world. Working together helps to multiply and spread the 
benefits of fair competition, in Europe and worldwide. 
2. Ensuring a true level playing field for all: how State aid control helps tackle the 
challenge 
One of the key duties of the Commission, and in particular of the Commissioner for 
Competition, is to make sure that EU rules apply in a fair manner to any company that does 
business in the EU's single market - regardless of size, sector or nationality. This is the only 
                                                            
1 State of the Union 2016, available at http://ec.europa.eu/priorities/state-union-2016_en  
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way to ensure a true level playing field and it is the reason why the Commission has been 
enforcing State aid rules over the past decades. 
Taking actions against selective tax advantages  
This approach applies to fiscal aid too: if a few selected companies can avoid tax, it makes it 
hard for companies that do pay their share of taxes to compete on equal terms. Giving a 
specific tax treatment to a particular company gives that company a benefit comparable to 
receiving cash. For that reason, the State aid rules apply to tax exemptions just as much as to 
any other type of aid. The Commission has been very active in tackling illegal State aid 
granted by means of tax rulings
2
. In August 2016, the Commission concluded that Ireland 
granted undue tax benefits, illegal under EU State aid rules, to Apple
3
. 
How tax rulings can involve State aid: The Apple decision 
The Commission found that two tax rulings issued by Ireland to Apple substantially and artificially 
lowered the tax paid by Apple in Ireland since 1991. The rulings endorsed a method to establish the 
taxable profits for two Irish incorporated companies of the Apple group (Apple Sales International and 
Apple Operations Europe) in Ireland, which did not correspond to economic reality: almost all profit 
from sales recorded by the two companies were internally attributed outside Ireland to a "head office" 
that existed only on paper since it had no physical presence and no employees anywhere in the world, 
and that could never have generated those profits. As a result of the profit attribution method endorsed 
in the tax rulings, Apple paid substantially less tax than other businesses in Ireland over its trading 
profits: this selective treatment allowed Apple to pay an effective corporate tax rate of 1 per cent on its 
European profits in 2003 down to 0.005 per cent in 2014.   
The selective tax treatment of Apple in Ireland is illegal under EU state aid rules, because it gives 
Apple a significant advantage over companies that are subject to the regular national taxation rules. 
The Commission can order recovery of illegal state aid for a ten-year period preceding the 
Commission's first request for information in 2013. Ireland must now recover the unpaid taxes in 
Ireland from Apple for the years 2003 to 2014 of up to EUR 13 billion, plus interest. 
As a matter of principle, EU State aid rules require that incompatible State aid is recovered in 
order to remove the distortion of competition created by the aid. There are no fines under EU 
State aid rules and recovery does not penalise the company in question. It simply restores 
equal treatment with other companies. Furthermore, all Commission decisions are subject to 
scrutiny by the EU Courts. If a Member State decides to appeal a Commission decision, it 
must still recover the illegal State aid unless it requests and successfully obtains interim 
measures ordering suspension of recovery from the EU Court. To fulfil its recovery obligation 
pending the outcome of the EC Court procedures, the Member State may, for example, place 
the recovered amount in an escrow account.  
In September, the Commission also opened an in-depth investigation into Luxembourg's tax 
treatment of the GDF Suez group (now Engie)
4
. The Commission has concerns that several 
                                                            
2 See Case SA.38374 Alleged aid to Starbucks, Commission decision of 21 October 2015, available at http://ec. 
europa.eu/competition/elojade/isef/case_details.cfm?proc_code=3_SA_38374; Case SA.38375 Alleged aid to 
FFT- Luxembourg, Commission decision of 21 October 2015, available at http://ec.europa.eu/competition/ 
elojade/isef/case_details.cfm?proc_code=3_SA_38375; Case SA.37667 Excess Profit exemption in Belgium, 
Commission decision of 11 January 2016, available at http://ec.europa.eu/competition/elojade/isef/case_details. 
cfm?proc_code=3_SA_37667  
3 Case SA.38373 Alleged aid to Apple, Commission decision of 30 August 2016, available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/elojade/isef/case_details.cfm?proc_code=3_SA_38373 
4 Case SA.44888 Potential aid to GDF Suez, Commission decision to initiate the formal investigation procedure 
of 19 September 2016, available at http://ec.europa.eu/competition/elojade/isef/case_details.cfm?proc_code=3_ 
SA_44888  
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tax rulings issued by Luxembourg may have given GDF Suez an unfair advantage over other 
companies, in breach of EU State aid rules
5
. The Commission also pursued the investigation 
into tax rulings granted by Luxembourg to McDonald's
6
, and the investigation into a transfer 
pricing arrangement granted by Luxembourg to Amazon
7
.  
To effectively complement its enforcement activities, the Commission has also proposed a 
coordinated EU wide response to corporate tax avoidance, following the global standards 
developed by the OECD in autumn 2015. To that effect, in January the Commission adopted 
an ambitious Anti-Tax Avoidance Package
8
, to help Member States take strong and 
coordinated action against tax avoidance and ensure that companies pay taxes wherever they 
make their profits in the EU.  
In addition, in April the Commission adopted a proposal for a Directive which imposes on EU 
and non-EU multinational groups the publication of country-by-country reporting on the 
profit and tax paid as well as other information
9
. This type of reports will enable citizens to 
assess the tax strategies and the contribution to welfare by multinationals, leading the way 
towards greater corporate tax transparency. 
Increased transparency and legal certainty with the completion of the State Aid 
Modernisation initiative 
Transparency is important because it promotes the good use of taxpayers' money, and it has 
been a key pillar also of the State Aid Modernisation initiative, launched in 2012 in order to 
provide legal certainty and cut red tape for public authorities and companies
10
. A way to 
promote transparency is giving market participants relevant information about State aid 
measures granted by the Member States. 
According to the new rules, granting authorities at all levels are required to provide 
information for each individual aid award exceeding EUR 500,000. As of July 2016 and 
starting from the date of the grant, the authorities have six months to publish, in a searchable 
database, information on the identity of the individual beneficiaries and on the received 
awards
11
. Transparency goes hand-in-hand with the simplified application of State aid rules 
that makes it easier for Member States to grant aid measures without the need to notify them 
to the Commission in advance. 
To help public authorities and companies identify when public spending falls within, and 
outside, the scope of EU State aid control, in May the Commission published the Notice on 
the notion of aid as one of the last building blocks of its State Aid Modernisation initiative
12
. 
                                                            
5 For additional information, please see the Staff Working Document accompanying this Report. 
6 Case SA.38945 Alleged aid to Mc Donald's – Luxembourg, available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/elojade/isef/case_details.cfm?proc_code=3_SA_38945  
7 Case SA.38944 Alleged aid to Amazon, available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/elojade/isef/case_details.cfm?proc_code=3_SA_38944 
8 See http://ec.europa.eu/taxation_customs/business/company-tax/anti-tax-avoidance-package_en  
9 Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Directive 2013/34/EU as 
regards disclosure of income tax information by certain undertakings and branches, COM/2016/0198 final, 
available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:52016PC0198  
10 See http://ec.europa.eu/competition/state_aid/modernisation/index_en.html  
11 The list of beneficiaries and other details about aid awards can be found at: 
https://webgate.ec.europa.eu/competition/transparency/public/search/home/ 
12 Commission Notice on the notion of State aid as referred to in Article 107(1) of the Treaty on the Functioning 
of the European Union, OJ C 262, 19.7.2016, p. 1–50, available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/?uri=uriserv:OJ.C_.2016.262.01.0001.01.ENG&toc=OJ:C:2016:262:TOC  
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The Notice gives clear guidance on all aspects of the definition of State aid. It is particularly 
important to facilitate public investment, as it helps Member States and companies design 
public funding in ways which do not risk distorting the level playing field in the Single 
Market or crowding out private investment. This will help maximise the effect of investments 
on economic growth and jobs, in line with the Commission's Investment Plan for Europe
13
.  
3. Boosting competition and innovation across the Digital Single Market 
The market for digital services has quickly become one of the areas that matter most for 
European consumers. Digital technology can provide low prices, wide choice, rapid 
innovation, but whether consumers actually get those benefits depends on how the market 
works. The aim of competition policy is to ensure that consumers are treated fairly and that 
powerful businesses are prevented from striking deals that raise prices, or suppress 
innovation, or deny people the freedom to choose the products they want.  
In this way the Digital Single Market is about much more than just making the economy more 
efficient. It is a way to give everyone a fair chance to reap the benefits of technological 
development. And it is a way to put consumers in control.  
E-commerce is a case in point: the majority of adults in the EU have ordered consumer goods 
or services online in 2015, with the figure rising in some Member States to more than eight in 
ten people. E-commerce has become an important driver of price transparency and price 
competition, increasing consumers' choice and their ability to find the best deals, thus 
spurring competition and innovation. While it also creates new opportunities for businesses, 
dealing with a fast changing e-commerce marketplace may not be always easy. All companies 
active online, such as retailers and distributors but also manufacturers as well as content 
creators, are now faced with novel and significant challenges. The e-commerce sector inquiry 
launched by the Commission in 2015, as part of its Digital Single Market Strategy, 
contributes to a better understanding of those challenges and opportunities
14
.  
The e-commerce sector inquiry: First results and follow-up 
In September 2016, the Commission published the initial findings of the sector inquiry. During the 
inquiry the Commission gathered evidence from nearly 1,800 companies operating in e-commerce of 
consumer goods and digital content, and analysed around 8,000 distribution contracts. The Preliminary 
Report confirms the growing significance of e-commerce but also identifies certain business practices 
that may limit this online competition, in particular concerning online sales of consumer goods and 
copyright licensing agreements. The Commission may open case specific investigations on business 
practices that may raise competition concerns. The Preliminary Report was subject to a public 
consultation which ended on 18 November 2016. 
In March, the Commission published its initial findings on geo-blocking, which found that the practice 
is widespread in e-commerce throughout the EU, especially for digital content. Almost 60% of 
responding digital content providers has contractually agreed with right holders to geo-block. If geo-
blocking is the result of agreements between suppliers and distributors, it may restrict 
competition in the Single Market in breach of EU antitrust rules. Like any competition enforcement 
activity, investigations regarding geo-blocking require legal and economic assessment, which also 
includes an analysis of potential justifications for restrictions that have been identified. 
Most geo-blocking by retailers is based on unilateral business decisions not to sell cross-
border, i.e. independently from agreements with or commercial pressure of any supplier, and 
falls outside the scope of the EU competition rules. In the framework of the Digital Single 
                                                            
13 See https://ec.europa.eu/priorities/jobs-growth-and-investment/investment-plan_en  
14 See http://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/sector_inquiries_e_commerce.html  
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Market Strategy, in May 2016 the Commission also adopted a proposal for a Regulation 
aiming at addressing geo-blocking and other forms of discrimination based on customers' 
nationality, place of residence or place of establishment, identifying those situations where 
different treatment of customers due to their location cannot be in any case justified
15
. 
Preserving innovation when faced with online dominant players 
Certain business practices may limit consumer choice, but there is an even bigger problem 
when new products are prevented from reaching the market. Antitrust enforcement is essential 
to ensure that dominant companies do not deny others a chance to come up with the next 
generation of innovative ideas. 
Search engines have a key role in guiding consumers across the digital environment, and the 
Commission considers this market as one of its enforcement priorities. In July, two 
Statements of Objections were sent to Google and its parent company, Alphabet
16
. The 
Commission reinforced, in a supplementary Statement of Objections that follows the one 
issued in the same case in April 2015, its preliminary conclusion that Google has abused its 
dominant position by systematically favouring its comparison shopping service in its search 
result pages. The Commission is concerned that users do not necessarily see the most relevant 
results in response to queries, which would be to the detriment of consumers and innovation 
in the market. By sending a supplementary Statement of Objections, the Commission 
reinforced its preliminary conclusion whilst at the same time protecting Google's rights of 
defence by giving it an opportunity to respond formally to the additional evidence. On-going 
investigation by the Commission is always without prejudice to the final decision to be taken 
by the Commission in the case.  
Separately, the Commission also sent a Statement of Objections to Google on restrictions that 
the company has placed on the ability of certain third party websites to display search 
advertisements from Google's competitors
17
. Google places search ads directly on the Google 
search website but also as an intermediary on third party websites, such as online retailers, 
telecoms operators and newspapers, through its "AdSense for Search" platform. The 
Commission's preliminary view is that these practices have enabled Google to prevent 
existing and potential competitors, including other search providers and online advertising 
platforms, from entering and growing in this commercially important area.  
Smartphones and tablets account for more than half of global internet traffic, and are expected 
to account for even more in the future. A competitive mobile internet sector is increasingly 
important for consumers and businesses in Europe and the Commission has been extremely 
vigilant to promote fair and vibrant competition in this area.  
In April, the Commission sent a Statement of Objections informing Google of its preliminary 
view that the company has, in breach of EU antitrust rules, abused its dominant position 
                                                            
15 Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on addressing geo-blocking and other 
forms of discrimination based on customers' nationality, place of residence or place of establishment within the 
internal market and amending Regulation (EC) No 2006/2004 and Directive 2009/22/EC, COM/2016/0289 final 
- 2016/0152 (COD), available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A52016PC0289  
16 Case AT.39740 Google search, see IP/16/2532 of 14 July 2016, available at http://europa.eu/rapid/press-
release_IP-16-2532_en.htm  
17 Case AT.40411 Google Search (AdSense), see IP/16/2532 of 14 July 2016, available at 
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-16-2532_en.htm  
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through restrictive terms in agreement with Android device manufacturers and mobile 
network operators
18
.  
The Commission's preliminary findings indicate that, as a consequence of Google's behaviour, 
rival search engines, mobile operating systems and web browsers may have not been able to 
compete on their merits, but rather been artificially excluded from certain business 
opportunities. At the same time, consumers may have been denied a wider choice of mobile 
apps, online services and innovative platforms, in breach of EU antitrust rules.  
The Commission has also continued pursuing the antitrust investigation opened in 2015 
against Amazon, the biggest e-book distributor in Europe
19
. The Commission has concerns 
that Amazon's arrangements with publishers may make it more difficult for other e-book 
distributors to compete with Amazon by developing new and innovative products and 
services.  
Towards a borderless market for digital content: the pay-tv case 
A true Digital Single Market means that EU consumers should be able to watch the pay-TV 
channels of their choice regardless of where they live or travel in the EU. The Commission is 
looking at whether the licensing agreements between six major EU film studios and Sky UK, 
preventing consumers in other EU countries to access Sky’s UK and Irish pay-TV services, 
may be in breach of EU competition rules
20
. 
In April, Paramount offered commitments to address the Commission's concerns regarding 
certain clauses in film licensing contracts for pay-TV between Paramount and Sky UK. The 
Commission then consulted market participants to verify the appropriateness of the proposed 
commitments and, in the light of the results of this market test, considered that the 
commitments, as clarified by Paramount, addressed its concerns. In July, the Commission 
adopted a decision to make the commitments offered by Paramount legally binding under EU 
antitrust rules
21
. The Commission's investigation continues regarding the conduct of Disney, 
NBCUniversal, Sony, Twentieth Century Fox, Warner Bros and Sky. 
An open and competitive telecoms framework, to the benefit of European consumers 
Consumers would not be able to enjoy new digital service without a good, affordable internet 
connection. That means that affordable mobile networks are essential, and so is competition: 
competition keeps prices down, and drives mobile operators to invest in better networks. To 
promote a genuine Digital Single Market, the Commission cannot leave any room for 
anticompetitive agreements or mergers that harm competition, and raise prices for 
consumers
22
. 
 
                                                            
18 Case AT.40099 Google Android, see IP/16/1492 of 20 April 2016, available at http://europa.eu/rapid/press-
release_IP-16-1492_en.htm  
19 Case AT.40153 E-book MFNs and related matters, available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/elojade/isef/case_details.cfm?proc_code=1_40153  
20 Case AT.40023 Cross-border access to pay-TV content, available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/elojade/isef/case_details.cfm?proc_code=1_40023  
21 See IP/16/2645, available at http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-16-2645_en.htm  
22 See Case M.7612 Hutchison 3G UK   / Telefónica UK, Commission decision of 11 May 2016, available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/elojade/isef/case_details.cfm?proc_code=2_M_7612 and Case M.7758 
Hutchison 3G Italy   / Wind   / JV, Commission decision of 1 September 2016, available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/elojade/isef/case_details.cfm?proc_code=2_M_7758 
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Two important merger control decisions in the telecoms sector 
Conditions today vary significantly from one national telecoms market to another. There is no "one 
size fits all", and the Commission always takes the different specificities into account in its analysis. 
Following an in-depth investigation, in May the Commission blocked under the EU Merger 
Regulation the proposed acquisition of Telefónica UK's "O2" by Hutchison 3G UK's "Three", that 
would have created a new market leader in the mobile market in the United Kingdom. The 
Commission had strong concerns that the significantly reduced competition in the market would have 
resulted in higher prices and less choice for consumers in the United Kingdom. The takeover would 
also likely have hampered innovation and the development of network infrastructure in the United 
Kingdom, which is a serious concern especially for fast moving markets. The remedies proposed by 
Hutchison failed to adequately address the concerns raised by the takeover. 
In September, the Commission approved under the EU Merger Regulation a proposed 
telecommunications joint venture between Hutchison and VimpelCom in Italy, subject to conditions. 
Following an in-depth review, the Commission concluded that the structural remedies offered by 
Hutchison and VimpelCom fully addressed the Commission's competition concerns. The parties will 
ensure the market entry of French telecom operator Iliad as a new mobile network operator in Italy. 
This means that the two operators can grow and reap the benefits of combining their assets, whilst 
Italian mobile customers will continue to profit from innovative mobile services at fair prices and on 
high quality networks. The case shows that telecom companies in Europe can grow both within the 
same country and cross-border, provided effective competition is preserved.  
In October, the Commission opened an investigation into a network sharing agreement 
between two Czech operators of mobile telephony, O2 CZ/CETIN and T-Mobile CZ
23
. O2 CZ 
and T-Mobile CZ are both major telecoms operators in the Czech Republic, and together they 
serve approximately three quarters of the Czech retail mobile telecommunications market. 
The Commission is investigating in particular whether the cooperation between O2 
CZ/CETIN and T-Mobile CZ risks slowing down quality improvements in existing 
infrastructure, and delaying or hindering the deployment of new technologies and services, in 
particular in densely populated areas. The Commission will also investigate the impact of 
potential efficiencies that could be brought about by the network sharing. Based on this 
assessment, the Commission will establish whether the cooperation violates Article 101 
TFEU that prohibits anticompetitive business practices. 
To ensure a pro-competitive telecoms framework, in September 2016 the Commission 
presented a proposal for a Directive establishing the "European Electronic Communications 
Code", and a proposal for a Regulation establishing the Body of European Regulators for 
Electronic Communications (BEREC).  
Promoting inclusive access to high speed broadband networks 
In order to seize all the opportunities of the digital work, Europe also needs a first-class 
telecoms infrastructure. A key priority of the Digital Single Market strategy
24
 is ensuring that 
EU citizens and companies, in particular small and medium sized ones, can access high speed 
broadband networks. Public funding is often needed to attain this objective while ensuring 
inclusion, particularly as concerns rural areas that are less attractive for private investors. 
                                                            
23 Case AT.40305 Network sharing between O2 CZ / CETIN and T-Mobile CZ in the Czech Republic, see 
IP/16/3539 of 25 October 2016, available at http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-16-3539_en.htm  
24 In its Communication "Connectivity for a Competitive Digital Single Market - Towards a European Gigabit" 
(COM/2016/587), the Commission confirmed the importance of Internet connectivity for the Digital Single 
Market and, building on the Digital Agenda for Europe goals, set out a vision for a European Gigabit society 
operationalised through three strategic objectives for 2025. 
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The Commission approved under EU State aid rules the UK National Broadband Scheme for 
2016-2020
25
, Italy's ultra-broadband plan for 2016-2022
26
 and the French broadband scheme 
"Plan Très Haut Débit"
27
. Each scheme was also accompanied by a detailed evaluation plan to 
assess its impact, the results of which will be submitted to the Commission. 
The Commission's State aid assessment is based on the 2013 Broadband Guidelines
28
. The 
goal is to avoid that public funding takes the place of private investment, and to promote 
effective competition by ensuring that other service providers can use the publicly funded 
infrastructure on a non-discriminatory basis. 
4. Delivering a Single Market that empowers EU citizens and businesses  
By creating a deeper and fairer Single Market, competition policy has a very concrete impact 
on people's life: EU citizens and business deal with the market every single day. Building a 
society that treats everyone fairly means that the market should work in a way that empowers 
consumers and ensures that their voices are heard. Competition enforcement steps in when, 
for instance because of a cartel, consumers pay more than they should or have troubles 
finding the product they look for. Merger control is also essential to ensure that mergers do 
not harm the competitive structure of the markets and thus consumers and the wider economy. 
In order for the Single Market to reach its full potential, the Commission has recently stepped 
up its efforts on the effective enforcement of European rules across all policy areas. In 
December 2016 the Commission adopted a Communication on "EU law: Better results 
through better application"
29
 to make the application, implementation and enforcement of EU 
law more strategic and more focused, for the benefit of citizens, consumers and businesses.  
Achieving an efficient and sustainable transport sector across the EU  
The transport sector represents a key sector for European households: transport-related goods 
and services are the second biggest household budget item after house-related expenditure
30
. 
Competitive prices for transport services are directly important for millions of Europeans.  
In October, the Commission sent a Statement of Objections to Brussels Airlines and TAP 
Portugal on their codeshare cooperation on passenger services between Brussels and Lisbon
31
. 
A codeshare agreement is a commercial agreement whereby the airline operating a flight 
allows another airline to market the flight and issue tickets for it, as if it were operating the 
flight itself. Codeshare partners also agree on how they will compensate each other for the 
seats they sell on their partner's flights. Codesharing can bring benefits for passengers in 
terms of wider network coverage and better connections. However, the Commission has 
concerns that in this particular case Brussels Airlines and TAP Portugal may have used their 
                                                            
25 Case SA.40720 National Broadband Scheme for the UK for 2016-2020, Commission decision of 26 May 
2016, available at http://ec.europa.eu/competition/elojade/isef/case_details.cfm?proc_code=3_SA_40720  
26 Case SA.41647 Italy - Strategia Banda Ultra Larga, Commission decision of 30 June 2016, available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/elojade/isef/case_details.cfm?proc_code=3_SA_41647   
27 Case SA.37183 Plan France Très Haut Débit, Commission decision of 7 November 2016, available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/elojade/isef/case_details.cfm?proc_code=3_SA_37183  
28 Communication from the Commission, EU Guidelines for the application of State aid rules in relation to the 
rapid deployment of broadband networks, OJ 2013 C 25, 26.1.2013, available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/ 
LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:C:2013:025:0001:0026:en:PDF 
29 See https://ec.europa.eu/info/law/law-making-process/overview-law-making-process/applying-eu-law_en  
30 Source: Eurostat. See http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php/Archive:Household_ 
consumption_expenditure_-_national_accounts  
31 Case AT.39860 Brussels Airlines/TAP Air Portugal, see IP/16/3563 of 27 October 2016, available at 
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-16-3563_en.htm  
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codesharing to restrict competition and harm passengers' interests on the Brussels to Lisbon 
route. 
The Commission also opened in November an investigation to assess whether the Czech 
railway incumbent České dráhy, a.s. (ČD) charged prices below costs with the aim of shutting 
out competition in rail passenger transport services, in breach of EU antitrust rules
32
. 
Competition is essential to drive prices down and service quality up, especially in previously 
monopolised markets. The Commission will take a close look at České dráhy's business 
practices to make sure it does not push competitors out of the market to the detriment of 
passengers. The opening of proceedings does not prejudge the outcome of the investigation. 
Railway incumbents have often been subject to competition scrutiny. In April, the 
Commission relieved Deutsche Bahn ahead of schedule from commitments made binding in 
December 2013, as several competitors have now entered the German railway traction current 
market, thereby addressing the Commission's competition concerns. The growth in the level 
of competition in the German railway power supply market confirms that the commitments 
were successful at remedying Commission's competition concerns. This is a good example of 
how commitment decisions can quickly and effectively open up markets, ensure a level 
playing field and lead to more competition and lower prices for consumers and businesses. 
Transport is also an important area for growth, due to its specific function in servicing the 
other sectors of the economy. Road haulage, in particular, is an essential part of the European 
Single Market: there are over 30 million trucks on European roads, which account for around 
three quarters of inland transport of goods in Europe. The competitiveness of the sector is 
contingent on the prices of the vehicles used by transporters. 
In July, the Commission found that MAN, Volvo/Renault, Daimler, Iveco and DAF broke EU 
antitrust rules, and imposed a record fine of EUR 2.9 billion
33
.  
A landmark decision in the road transport sector: The trucks cartel case 
The Commission's decision relates specifically to the market for the manufacturing of medium 
(weighing between 6 to 16 tons) and heavy trucks (weighing over 16 tons). MAN, Volvo/Renault, 
Daimler, Iveco and DAF together account for around 9 of every 10 medium and heavy trucks 
produced in Europe.  
Instead of competing with each other, the companies colluded on pricing for over 14 years, from 1997 
to 2011, until the Commission carried out unannounced inspections of the firms. Over the years the 
discussions between the companies covered the same topics, namely the respective "gross list" price 
increases, the timing for the introduction of new emissions technologies and the passing on to 
customers of the costs for the emissions technologies. All companies acknowledged their involvement 
and agreed to settle the case. 
Proceedings were also opened with regard to Scania, which was not part of the settlement decision. 
Therefore, for this company the investigation continues under the standard (non-settlement) cartel 
procedure. 
This decision is also important to stress the importance of a functioning competitive market in 
fostering the development and dissemination of cost-efficient low-emission technologies, which is one 
of the elements of the European Strategy for low-emission mobility. 
                                                            
32 See IP/16/3656 of 10 November 2016, available at http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-16-3656_en.htm  
33 Case AT.39824 Trucks, Commission decision of 19 July 2016, available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/elojade/isef/case_details.cfm?proc_code=1_39824.  
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Protecting competition in concentrated markets 
The role of Commission's merger control is very important to protect fair competition across 
all sectors and industries, but it may be even more relevant in sectors that are already 
relatively concentrated. The Commission needs to make sure that powerful companies do not 
misuse their power in a way that benefits them, but harms their customers and the rest of the 
economy. 
For example, the Commission has been particularly vigilant in the crop protection market, to 
ensure that the market structures resulting from mergers do not end up negatively affecting 
European farmers, whose livelihood depends on access to seeds and crop protection at 
competitive prices. In 2016, the Commission opened two in-depth investigations into 
proposed mergers in this area. 
The first proposed transaction concerns Dow and DuPont, two US firms, and would create the 
world's largest integrated crop protection and seeds company
34
. It would combine two 
competitors with leading herbicides and insecticides portfolios and with a strong track record 
of bringing innovative crop protection and seeds products to the market. The second proposed 
merger is between Syngenta of Switzerland, one of the main global seeds and crop protection 
companies, and ChemChina of China, which controls Adama, the largest supplier of generic 
crop protection products in Europe
35
. Their products are used for the cultivation of several of 
the main crops grown in Europe, including cereals, cotton, corn, fruits and vegetables, oilseed 
rape, soybean, sugarbeet and sunflowers. The in-depth investigations will look at whether the 
proposed mergers could lead to higher prices or less innovation for these products. 
A fairer financial sector to underpin the real economy 
Financial markets provide an essential function for the European economy, and in order to 
support the ongoing economic recovery they need to be stable, open and competitive. Since 
the onset of the crisis, competition policy has been playing a key role in achieving a more fair 
and transparent financial sector in the EU.  
In June 2016, all elements of the Interchange Fee Regulation became fully applicable
36
. The 
new rules make the costs of payments with debit or credit cards more transparent to retailers 
and consumers and allow them to make efficient choices. In the past, the fees charged by the 
banks for these card payments were largely kept in the dark even though the costs were 
ultimately paid by consumers. The Interchange Fee Regulation capped these fees, thus 
lowering costs to the benefit of millions of European consumers and retailers. 
In parallel, the Commission continued its antitrust investigation into MasterCard's and Visa's 
inter-bank fees in relation to payments made by cardholders from non-EEA (European 
Economic Area) countries, which are not part of the Interchange Fee Regulation and are still a 
burden for European merchants
37
. The Commission has also continued the investigation into 
                                                            
34 Case M.7932 Dow / DuPont, available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/elojade/isef/case_details.cfm?proc_code=2_M_7932    
35 Case M.7962 Chemchina / Syngenta, available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/elojade/isef/case_details.cfm?proc_code=2_M_7962  
36 Regulation (EU) 2015/751 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2015 on interchange 
fees for card-based payment transactions, OJ L 123, 19.5.2015, available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/?uri=uriserv%3AOJ.L_.2015.123.01.0001.01.ENG. 
37 Case AT.40049 Mastercard II, available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/elojade/isef/case_details.cfm?proc_code=1_40049 and AT.39398 Visa MIF, 
available at http://ec.europa.eu/competition/elojade/isef/case_details.cfm?proc_code=1_39398. 
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MasterCard's rules with respect to cross-border acquiring, which limit the possibility for a 
merchant to benefit from better conditions offered by banks established elsewhere in the 
internal market. 
Businesses and households need sound financial intermediaries – typically banks – to 
underpin investment and consumption decisions. The crisis showed that when banks in 
Europe have problems, the effects can reach far beyond the immediate threat to depositors and 
shareholders. It can severely affect a country’s financial stability, and almost inevitably has 
spillover effects on other Member States and even beyond the EU. In this context, State aid 
control remained an essential tool to ensure a safer and sounder banking sector in the EU.  
State aid rules are an integral part of the Banking Union, guaranteeing equal treatment 
between the Member States that are in the Banking Union and those that are not. The role of 
State aid control is to ensure that the choices made by the national government do not unduly 
burden the public purse or distort the level playing field in the EU. In 2016 the Commission 
took several decisions to help stabilise the banking sectors in various Member States
38
. 
The Commission has also opened an in-depth investigation to assess, under the EU Merger 
Regulation, whether the proposed merger between Deutsche Börse AG (DB) and London 
Stock Exchange Group (LSE) would reduce competition in several financial market 
infrastructure areas
39
. The proposed merger would combine the activities of DB and LSE. By 
combining the exchanges of Germany, the United Kingdom and Italy, as well as several of the 
largest European clearing houses, it would create by far the largest European exchange 
operator. 
Enhancing transparency in the area of financial derivatives has also been a Commission 
priority. In July, the Commission accepted the commitments offered by the International 
Swaps and Derivatives Association Inc. (ISDA) and information service provider Markit, 
concerning the licensing of intellectual property that is needed to offer trading services on the 
market for credit default swaps (CDS)
40
. A CDS is a contract designed to transfer the credit 
risk, or risk of default, linked to a debt obligation such as government or corporate bonds. 
CDS are used by investors both to hedge risks and as investments.  
The Commission had market tested the draft commitments in April and the outcome was 
positive. In the light of the results of the market test, Markit proposed minor modifications 
and clarifications to the initial commitments. The final commitments address the 
Commission's concerns as they will make it easier to trade CDS on exchanges, while 
improving transparency. The Commission's decision ensures that all trading venues can 
benefit from fair, reasonable and non-discriminatory access to data and intellectual property 
owned by ISDA and Markit to offer all-to-all trading of credit derivatives. This increases 
market stability and also translates into more choice and lower transaction costs for investors. 
The commitments thereby contribute to the aim of the MifiD 2
41
 and of the Banking Union
42
.  
                                                            
38 For additional information, please see the Annex of the Staff Working Document accompanying this Report. 
39 Case M.7995 Deutsche Börse / London Stock Exchange Group, available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/elojade/isef/case_details.cfm?proc_code=2_M_7995  
40 Case AT.39745 CDS - Information market, Commission decision of 20 July 2016, available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/elojade/isef/case_details.cfm?proc_code=1_39745  
41 Markets in Financial Instruments Directive. See http://ec.europa.eu/finance/securities/isd/mifid2/ 
index_en.htm  
42 For additional information on the Banking Union, see http://ec.europa.eu/finance/general-policy/banking-
union/index_en.htm.  
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Furthermore, in December the Commission fined Crédit Agricole, HSBC and JPMorgan 
Chase a total of EUR 485 million, for participating in a cartel in euro interest rate 
derivatives
43
. Barclays, Deutsche Bank, RBS and Société Générale reached a settlement with 
the Commission on the same cartel case in December 2013. Given that Crédit Agricole, 
HSBC and JPMorgan Chase chose not to settle, the investigation continued under the 
Commission's standard cartel procedure. This decision marks the end of the first of several 
cartels detected and punished in the financial services sector. 
Enforcing competition rules in the world of sport   
The scope of competition law has of course some limitations, but when competition 
enforcement is the right tool, it is important that the Commission takes timely action to restore 
fairness in a specific area of the economy. Some sectors have a long tradition of competition 
policy decisions, but this may not always be the case for other sectors. Sport is a recent 
example. 
In September 2016, the Commission informed the International Skating Union (ISU) of its 
preliminary view that the ISU rules under which athletes face severe penalties for 
participation in unauthorised speed skating events may be in breach of EU antitrust rules
44
. 
Competition law and sport federations: The International Skating Union investigation 
The ISU is the sole body recognised by the International Olympic Committee to administer the sports 
of figure skating and speed skating on ice. Its members are national ice-skating associations. Sporting 
rules are subject to EU antitrust rules when the body setting the rules or the companies and persons 
affected by the rules are engaged in an economic activity. 
International sports governing bodies play a unique role in setting the rules of the game and ensuring 
uniform standards of conduct. According to the rules established by the ISU, if an athlete participates 
in an unauthorised event, the athlete faces a range of penalties leading potentially to a life-time ban 
from all key international speed skating competitions. The Commission has concerns that the penalties 
set out in the ISU rules restrict the commercial freedom of athletes and prevent new organisers of 
international speed skating events from entering the market because they are unable to attract top 
athletes. 
The Commission has decided to pursue this investigation because it raises specific allegations of 
breaches of competition law at the international level, rather than wider issues related to the 
governance of sport.  
Besides, State aid control plays a role in preserving the level playing field in sports. Following 
three separate in-depth investigations, in July 2016 the Commission concluded that public 
support measures granted by Spain to seven professional football clubs gave those clubs an 
unfair advantage over other clubs, in breach of EU State aid rules
45
. EU State aid rules apply 
to public interventions in the market to ensure that they do not distort competition by 
selectively favouring one market participant over another. Professional football is a 
commercial activity, and public money in this area must comply with fair competition rules. 
                                                            
43 Case AT.39914 Euro Interest Rate Derivatives, available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/elojade/isef/case_details.cfm?proc_code=1_39914  
44 Case AT.40208 International Skating Union’s Eligibility rules, see IP/16/3201of  27 September 2016, 
available at http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-16-3201_en.htm  
45 Cases SA.29769 Aid to certain Spanish football clubs (tax privileges for Real Madrid CF, FC Barcelona, 
Athletic Club Bilbao, Club Atlético Osasuna), SA.33754 Aid to Real Madrid, and SA.36387 Aid to Valencia 
football clubs  (Valencia, Hercules and Elche), see IP/16/2401 of 4 July 2016, available at 
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-16-2401_en.htm  
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This is especially important for the majority of professional clubs which have to operate 
without subsidies. 
5. Unlocking the potential of the European Energy Union and Circular Economy 
Consumers are active and central players on the energy markets of the future. Pushing for a 
truly competitive European energy market has the potential to impact the energy bills of 
European businesses and households: building an integrated and climate-friendly European 
Energy Union, free from technical or regulatory barriers, will give consumers across the EU a 
better choice of supply and the best energy deals.  
In November, the Commission presented a package of measures to keep the EU energy sector 
competitive and boost the clean energy transition
46
. The "Clean Energy for All Europeans" 
package has three main goals: putting energy efficiency first, achieving global leadership in 
renewable energies, and providing a fair deal for consumers. The legislative proposals cover 
energy efficiency, renewable energy, the design of the electricity market, security of 
electricity supply and governance rules for the Energy Union. The package also contains a 
number of measures aimed at protecting the most vulnerable consumers.  
Along with the package, the Commission published the final report of its State aid sector 
inquiry into national measures to ensure that adequate capacity to produce electricity is 
available at all times (so-called "capacity mechanisms")
47
.  
Helping design better aid measures to secure electricity supplies 
The purpose of the State aid sector inquiry on capacity mechanisms, which covered over 120 market 
participants in eleven Member States, was to gather information on capacity mechanisms to examine, 
in particular, whether they ensure sufficient electricity supply without distorting competition or trade 
in the EU Single Market. 
Capacity mechanisms are very important as they can help reduce the risk of black-outs for European 
consumers and companies. At the same time, unnecessary and badly designed capacity mechanisms 
can distort competition, hamper necessary market reforms, hinder electricity flows across borders,lead 
to consumers overpaying for electricity and risk contradicting decarbonisation objectives. The final 
report concludes that Member States need to better assess the need for such mechanisms, and provides 
indications on how to deliver on security of supply while minimising competition distortions.  
Working for a pro-competitive oil and gas sector in the EU 
The exploration and production of oil and gas are key sectors in ensuring competitive energy 
prices for consumers and companies across the EU. They are also particularly important for 
the efficient use of available gas resources within the EU, a key element of the Energy Union 
strategy in terms of ensuring security of supply. 
In this area, the Commission opened an in-depth investigation into the acquisition of oilfield 
service provider Baker Hughes by Halliburton in January
48
. In May, the parties abandoned the 
proposed merger, following competition concerns against that transaction expressed by a 
number of competition agencies across the world, including the Commission. Based on the 
Commission's analysis, the proposed transaction raised competition concerns on a very large 
number of markets related to oilfield services provided to oil and gas exploration and 
                                                            
46 See IP/16/4009 of 30 November 2016, available at http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-16-4009_en.htm  
47 See http://ec.europa.eu/competition/sectors/energy/state_aid_to_secure_electricity_supply_en.html#2  
48 Case M.7477 Halliburton  / Baker Hughes, available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/elojade/isef/case_details.cfm?proc_code=2_M_7477  
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production companies in the European Economic Area (EEA). The Commission's 
investigation was carried out in close cooperation with a number of competition agencies 
across the world such as the US Department of Justice, the Brazilian competition authority 
(CADE) and the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission.  
The Commission also continued its investigations into the potential abuse by Gazprom of its 
dominant position in the supply of natural gas in Central and Eastern Europe
49
, and the 
possible foreclosure of gas markets in Bulgaria by the Bulgarian incumbent BEH
50
. The 
purpose of antitrust enforcement in this sector is to achieve more competitive gas markets in 
Europe and facilitate market integration as well as the exchanges of energy between Member 
States. 
Supporting recycling and renewable energy sources 
The transition towards a circular economy is a key block of the strategy for achieving a more 
sustainable Europe. "Closing the loop" of product lifecycles through greater recycling and re-
use brings benefits for both the environment and the economy. Effective competition in the 
waste management sector contributes to tackling the challenge by making recycling 
affordable for consumers. 
In September, the Commission fined Altstoff Recycling Austria (ARA) EUR 6 million for 
blocking competitors from entering the Austrian market for management of household 
packaging waste from 2008 to 2012, in breach of Article 102 TFEU which prohibits the abuse 
of a dominant market position
51
.  
Antitrust enforcement in the waste management sector 
In Austria, producers of goods are obliged to take back packaging waste that results from the use of 
their products. They may transfer this task to a company that takes care of the collection and recycling 
for them against a licence fee paid by goods' producers. The Commission found that competitors who 
wanted to enter or expand in the waste management market were dependent on receiving access to the 
nationwide collection infrastructure, partly controlled and partly owned by ARA. The investigation 
also found that between March 2008 and April 2012 ARA refused to give access to this infrastructure, 
so that competitors were excluded from the market and competition eliminated.  
After the Commission started its investigation, Austria adopted a new waste law in September 2013 
and ARA began granting access to its household waste collection infrastructure. Several competitors 
have entered the market since then. ARA acknowledged the infringement, ensured that the decision 
could benefit from administrative efficiencies, and proposed a structural remedy; the fine was 
therefore reduced by 30% due to ARA's cooperation with the Commission. 
While the parties cooperate with the Commission in commitment decisions and cartel settlement cases, 
the cooperation procedure was used in the context of a non-cartel antitrust prohibition decision for the 
first time since the entry into force of Regulation 1/2003. Cooperation in non-cartel antitrust 
proceedings may help strengthen the effectiveness of the Commission’s enforcement actions, and it 
could be applied to other cases in the future. 
Boosting recycling is only part of the path towards a more sustainable Europe: investing in 
low-carbon and clean energy technologies is also a priority. Renewables are the energy 
                                                            
49 Case AT.39816 Upstream gas supplies in Central and Eastern Europe, available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/elojade/isef/case_details.cfm?proc_code=1_39816  
50 Case AT.39849 BEH gas, available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/elojade/isef/case_details.cfm?proc_code=1_39849  
51 Case AT.39759 ARA foreclosure, Commission decision of 20 September 2016, available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/elojade/isef/case_details.cfm?proc_code=1_39759  
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sources of the future, and over the past few years almost every Member State adopted a 
renewable energy support scheme. In 2016, the Commission adopted under State aid rules 15 
decisions on new support schemes to renewable energy producers, contributing to increase the 
sustainability of the EU energy sector as well as environmental protection.  
7. Shaping a European and global competition culture 
In order to make a real difference in making the economy work more fairly for everyone, 
competition rules have to be applied evenly for all Europeans, regardless of the Member State 
where they live, work or shop. This is why the Commission has been looking at whether 
national competition authorities have all the powers, the resources and the independence they 
need to effectively enforce EU competition law. 
Stronger national competition authorities to effectively apply EU competition rules 
Enforcement of the EU competition rules is now taking place on a scale which the Commission could 
never have achieved on its own. Since 2004, the Commission and the national competition authorities 
took over 1000 enforcement decisions, with the national competition authorities being responsible for 
around 85% of the total. Action by a multiplicity of enforcers is a much stronger, more effective and 
better deterrent for companies that may be tempted to breach the EU competition rules. 
Building on the Communication on Ten Years of Regulation 1/200352, the Commission has reflected 
on whether the toolbox available to national competition authorities can be further improved. In 2016 
the Commission received and collected feedback on these issues from a wide range of stakeholders, 
including businesses and consumer groups, national competition authorities, national governments and 
members of the European Parliament. 
A public consultation held between November 2015 and February 2016 showed that approximately 
75% of respondents considered that the effectiveness of national competition authorities could be 
further enhanced. Also, 80% of replies supported taking action at EU level to ensure that national 
competition authorities have the means and instruments they need53.  
Furthermore, a Public Hearing was co-organised with the European Parliament on 19 April 2016 to 
gather additional views54. Given the overall support for empowering national competition authorities 
to be more effective enforcers, the Commission has started developing the way forward, in the form of 
a proposal for an EU legislative initiative. 
Keeping up with globalisation – Competition cooperation across the world    
With companies increasingly operating across national borders, a growing number of merger 
transactions, cartels and other anti-competitive practices have an international dimension and 
affect markets in several countries, and often different continents. As companies go global, so 
must competition enforcers: therefore, finding better ways to work together is a priority for 
competition authorities around the world.  
                                                            
52 Communication of 9 July 2014 from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council, Ten Years 
of Antitrust Enforcement under Regulation 1/2003: Achievements and Future Perspectives, COM(2014) 453, 
available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A52014DC0453. 
53 Public consultation on "Empowering the national competition authorities to be more effective enforcers of the 
EU competition rules", available at http://ec.europa.eu/competition/consultations/2015_effective_enforcers/ 
index_en.html. 
54 Public Hearing co-organised by the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs (ECON) of the European 
Parliament and DG Competition of the European Commission of 19 April 2016, available at 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/ep-live/en/committees/video?event=20160419-0900-COMMITTEE-ECON 
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Cooperation among competition authorities helps promote consistent outcomes, increases 
investigative efficiency by reducing unnecessary duplication of work, and encourages mutual 
understanding between agencies, while reducing costs for companies. In 2016 the 
Commission confirmed its commitment in this area, by actively participating in competition-
related international bodies such as the Competition Committee of the OECD, the World 
Bank and the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD). The 
Commission is also a leading member of the International Competition Network (ICN), the 
main global forum of competition agencies with 132 members. Important results of this 
multilateral engagement are the Merger Remedies Guide and the Cartel Working group's 
Catalogue on Investigative Powers, both adopted by the International Competition Network in 
2016. 
At bilateral level, in 2016 the Commission started Free Trade Agreements (FTAs) 
negotiations with Armenia, Mexico, Indonesia and Philippines, re-opened negotiations with 
Mercosur, and made progress in the negotiations with Japan. The Commission's efforts on 
FTA negotiations in the competition area focus on the inclusion of competition and State aid 
provisions, with the aim of promoting convergence of competition policy instruments and 
practices across jurisdictions, as well as protecting the global level playing field. 
In June 2016, the Commission submitted to the Council a draft agreement to include 
provisions on the exchange of information collected in the course of competition proceedings 
into the existing EU-Canada Cooperation agreement. The possibility to exchange evidence 
would improve cooperation between the Commission and the Canadian Competition Bureau, 
leading to enhanced competition law enforcement. In addition, the Commissioner for 
Competition Margrethe Vestager agreed with Chairman Sugimoto, the Head of the Japan Fair 
Trade Commission, to start negotiations to upgrade also the EU-Japan cooperation agreement 
with provisions for the exchange of evidence. 
The Commission is also actively engaged in technical cooperation with emerging economies 
that are developing their competition policy and enforcement regimes. In June, the 
Commission signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) with South-Africa, which adds 
to the MoUs signed with all other BRICS
55
 countries in recent years. 
Upholding a fruitful inter-institutional dialogue  
The European Parliament, the Council and the consultative committees, with their specific 
roles vis-à-vis European citizens and stakeholders, are important partners in the dialogue on 
competition policy. 
As in previous years, the Parliament adopted a resolution on the Commission's annual report 
on competition policy. The Commission welcomes the Parliament's support for competition 
policy as a cornerstone of the European project. The Commission agrees that competition 
empowers consumers, drives economic growth and keeps markets open for business, 
including SMEs. In this sense, competition policy makes markets fairer for everyone. The 
Commission agrees with Parliament that competition enforcement is essential to prevent 
abuses of economic power and to ensure that every company and entrepreneur has a fair share 
of the benefits of growth. 
The Commission welcomes the Parliament's engagement in the fight against tax evasion and 
tax avoidance. In April 2016, Commissioner Vestager exchanged views with the Parliament´s 
                                                            
55 Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa. 
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second Special Committee on Taxes. In 2016, the Commission undertook important actions in 
this area
56
. The Commission also obtained evidence on tax rulings from all Member States 
and is taking a systematic approach to analysing that evidence. In June 2016, the Commission 
published a Working Paper on State aid and tax rulings and organised a High Level Forum to 
give clarity to Member States on the application of the State aid rules to tax rulings.   
The Parliament reiterated its request to end the State aid crisis regime for banks. The 
Commission takes the view that current State aid rules are needed to preserve financial 
stability and minimise the cost to taxpayers, and to ensure that restructured banks return to 
lend to companies and households, thus contributing to the completion of the Banking Union. 
The State aid rules also preserve a level playing field between banks that receive State aid and 
banks that do not. In February 2016, Commissioner Vestager participated in an open 
exchange of views with MEPs to explain the Commission's approach under the State aid 
rules. 
Other recommendations from the Parliament are reflected in this Report, namely the 
contribution that an independent enforcement of the competition rules makes to the 
Commission's political priorities to deepen the Digital Single Market and the Energy Union, 
and to guarantee the competitiveness of the European industry in a globalised world. This 
Report lists the actions that the Commission took this year to safeguard competition in 
important sectors of the European economy. In May and August 2016, DG Competition also 
participated in workshops and debates in the Parliament to discuss the contribution that 
competition enforcement can make to improve the functioning of the food supply chain. 
The Commission welcomes the Parliament's call on the Commission to further a true 
competition culture in the Member States. In April 2016, the Commission and the Parliament 
organised a hearing on the Commission's initiative to allow national competition authorities to 
reach their full potential as effective enforcers of the European competition rules. 
Commissioner Vestager participated in the hearing. As part of her structured dialogue with 
Parliament, Commissioner Vestager also had an exchange with the ECON committee in 
October 2016. 
The Commission welcomes the interest of the European Economic and Social Committee and 
the Committee of the Regions on competition policy and is willing to engage in constructive 
exchanges. Commissioner Vestager participated in the debate on "European Competition 
Policy" at the plenary meeting of the Economic and Social Committee on 14 July 2016. In the 
Committee of the Regions, the Commission explained its approach to services of general 
economic interest in the EU. 
                                                            
56 For detailed information, see Chapter 2 of this Report. 
